Protection of New Zealand's native biodiversity and its primary production both depend on biosecurity measures to prevent invasion by alien, or exotic, organisms. At the same time, New Zealand's dependence on trade and travel in an increasingly globalised world places growing strain on the nation's biosecurity systems. Invasion by exotic species has potential for catastrophic impacts on both native biodiversity and human economic and social well-being. New Zealand's biosecurity policies have been gradually evolving from a narrow focus on production pests to a broader awareness of multiple economic, social and ecological objectives. This paper is about the process of reconciling conflicting objectives for biosecurity, with New Zealand as a case study example.
Introduction
'Biodiversity' or 'biological diversity' is the variety of life in all its forms, levels and combinations, including ecosystem diversity, species diversity and genetic diversity (IUCN-UNEP-WWF, 1991:210) . In the context of a particular country, such as New Biosecurity and biological invasion are not concepts that have received much attention from social scientists in recent years, despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of invasive species introductions have been human-caused. While there is a substantial literature on the distribution and ecological impacts of species invasions, there does not appear to be much analysis of the social and political elements of species spread and species invasions.
Since Carl Sauer, biogeographers have long studied the distribution of plants and animals, and the interactions of species with human society and culture, including the causes and consequences of species extinctions. Economists have considered the cost implications of species invasions, and have developed methods to assess the costs and benefits for decisions related to control of pests, weeds and quarantine measures.
For example, Naylor (2000) , has provided a model for assessing the economic impacts of biological invasion by exotic species. Zavaleta (2000) has provided estimates and compared the costs of leaving Tamarix invasion in the USA uncontrolled or imposing controls. She concludes that the cost of impacts of Tamarix invasion on water resources, and the subsequent impacts on agriculture, municipal water supplies, recreation and wildlife, outweigh the enormous cost of control measures. A growing number of political scientists, political economists, and sociologists have considered the implications for biosecurity and biosafety of trade liberalisation (for example, see NcNeely), and for the food security of native people.
However, important issues for social scientists remain consideration of the social consequences of biological invasions (who are the winners and who are the losers from biological introductions); the socio-political dynamics of decision-making about responses to bio-invasions (who are the winners and losers of political measures to 8
The impacts of biological invasions have been equally severe (although less well recognised) in New Zealand's marine areas. Exotic marine plants have been introduced to coastal waters by ships ballast and hull fouling (Green, 2000) .
In the words of a publication by the Department of Conservation, "Introduced invasive species pose the single largest threat to the survival of many of New Zealand's threatened species and ecosystems. Better assessment and management of the biosecurity risks to native flora and fauna is needed if we are to arrest the current decline of New Zealand's unique biodiversity." (D.o.C., 1999)
Biosecurity and Economic Welfare
New Zealand's economy depends substantially on production from farming, forestry fishing and tourism. Primary products, (meat, wool, dairy, horticulture, timber, and fish) account for fifty percent of New Zealand's exports (Statistics New Zealand, 2000:515) . In addition, tourism, New Zealand's top foreign exchange earner (Statistics New Zealand, 2000:306) is heavily dependent on natural attractions of the countryside.
At the same time as the destruction and erosion of native biodiversity, the country's economy has benefited greatly from a lack of pests, weeds and diseases commonly found elsewhere. For example, New Zealand has never experienced an outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth disease, and is free of such devastating diseases as avian influenza or Newcastle's disease (both of which attack poultry).
Nevertheless, despite, or perhaps because of, the comparative advantages that primary production has enjoyed from a relative lack of pests, weeds and diseases, New Insert Table 1 here Table 1 gives the weight of cargo unloaded at New Zealand seaports and airports between 1994 to 1999. It shows that, overall, the weight of cargo increased 22% in six years, with the vast bulk of the change coming from sea cargo (Statistics New Zealand, 2000:537) .
From a surveillance viewpoint, the increases represent a major increase in the workload of the border control services. And a particularly worrying aspect of the increase is the number of container cargos. The number of containers is estimated to have increased in the region of 114% between 1994 and 1999, from about 175,000 to about 375,000 (Budd and Arts, 2000:26) . Only a proportion of these containers are opened for inspection by the quarantine authorities. Containers may carry bioinvaders both on the outside (e.g. attached to mud and dirt) and on the inside. They may be transported inland for miles before being unloaded.
Insert Table 2   Table 2 shows the rapid change in the structure of trade that New Zealand experienced between 1989 and 1999. It shows an overall 94% increase in the value of imported merchandise, with an 80% growth of imports from the countries of Asia (ranging from 36% for Taiwan, to 544 for Malaysia, and 775% for China). Equally important was the growth in imports from "other countries" of 241%. This diversification of imports from Asia and "other countries" puts an additional strain on the biosecurity system because it requires a wider spread of pre-border agreements and controls. China, Malaysia and Thailand are countries of a continental mainland, and thereby more subject to natural biological dispersal than an island such as New Zealanders. Exporters from these countries are likely to be less concerned about biosecurity than New Zealanders because their borders are ecologically less distinct. In addition to the increases in importation of goods, the number of international visitors to the country has increased enormously. Between 1994 and 1999, the number of passengers who arrived by international airport increased 58% from approximately 2 million in 1994 to 3,166,741 (Budd and Arts, 2000:25) .
During the year 2000 MAF Quarantine Service reported that 1.8 tonnes of seed were confiscated in 4500 seizures, 16 tonnes of fruit fly host material was taken from passengers, and there were 168 seizures of live animals, including dogs and live eggs.
8.5 tonnes of meat and poultry products were taken off passengers, a third of which was undeclared, and two thirds from countries with foot-and-mouth disease (Sutton, 2001 ).
An intermittent review of newspapers over three months by one of the authors noted the following newspaper reports of biosecurity breaches:
• Discovery of a nest of red fire ants at Auckland airport (NZH, 22/12/2001:A7).
• Spread of Argentine ants to from Auckland to Hamilton, Bay of Plenty, and to Nelson and Christchurch in the South Island (WT, 2/9/01). First discovered in Auckland in 1990, the ants now appear to be impossible to eradicate.
• Capture of a pet Taiwanese stag beetle in an Auckland city home (NZH, 20/12/01:A3) which had been illegally smuggled in for recreational purposes;
• On-going efforts to eradicate an invasion of painted apple moth found in the Auckland vicinity (NZH 28/11/01). First discovered in Auckland in 1999, the 3 .
• Discovery of mycoplasma micoides (subspecies mycoides (large colony) in dairy calves (WT 21/12/2001) . Normally a disease of goats that had not previously been noted in New Zealand, the pathogen appears to have jumped the species barrier into cows.
• Efforts to halt the spread of the southern saltmarsh mosquito (Aedes (Ochlerotatus) camptorhynchus), an introduced mosquito dangerous to human health (NZH, 14/9/01).
These newspaper excerpts reflect the powerful pressures on New Zealand's biosecurity system brought about by current volumes of international travel and trade.
The Biosecurity Framework
Perhaps because New Zealand is a small island nation which has experienced significant biosecurity threats and problems, the biosecurity system that has evolved is unusual in the degree to which it operates as a relatively integrated framework. It involves different levels of government (national and regional), different biosecurity operations (surveillance, border control, and pre-and post-border control) and different biosecurity objectives (control of economically significant pests and weeds, protection of native species and ecosystems, protection of health, and the like) all working with some degree of inter-relationship. The system currently comprises:
pre-border measures (e.g. agreements with other countries on disease reporting procedures, checks and treatments of imported goods in countries of origin);
ii) a border control system that aims to prevent the entry of unwanted organisms into the country (Note: It is a managed risk approach that aims to reduce the risk of imports to 'acceptable levels'.)
iii) a system of emergency response to pest and disease incursion, the 'introduced disease and pest response' system; iv) a surveillance system responsible for detecting unwanted organisms that have entered the country; v) and a system of regional and national pest management for pests and diseases that have become established or naturalised in New Zealand. Biosecurity Council is a multi-stakeholder advisory body to the Minister, which includes representatives from relevant the government departments, regional councils, primary production interests, tourism, and environmental organisations.
In principle, a strength of the current system is that it recognises and provides for different biosecurity objectives (protection of human health, primary production, historically it has been strongly influenced by a production-focus that has meant a relative neglect of biodiversity concerns, most particularly, an almost total neglect of coastal and marine biosecurity. The professional background of top personnel in the Biosecurity Authority -veterinary science, animal health, production forestry, horticulture ( MAF 2002b) -make it likely that they will understand threats to primary production more easily than threats to native ecosystems. However, in fairness to the Biosecurity Authority, it should be noted that the Authority acknowledges the need for protection to all biosecurity sectors, and many of its pest and disease control operations are of equal importance for production and the native ecology. Its mission statement aims, "To protect New Zealand's unique biodiversity and facilitate exports by managing risks to plant and animal health and animal welfare." (MAF, 2002a) .
Perhaps more important, in purely practical terms, the knowledge base that biosecurity officials have at their disposal tends to favour surveillance and control of organisms that are commercially important, if for no other reason than that we know the threats that such organisms pose. In contrast, knowledge of ecologically significant organisms (marine, freshwater, and terrestrial) is much less. Frequently, our knowledge of the damaging potential of a new organism comes from the wisdom of hindsight. As Williams and West point out, "although there have been several attempts to predict the attributes of species that are likely to be [environmentally] invasive, most efforts have been unsuccessful. " (2000:428) .
Political process and Possible solutions
In 2001 the Minister for Biosecurity requested the preparation of a Biosecurity Strategy that will identify a policy framework for biosecurity decision making, suggest an appropriate level of protection against biosecurity risks, indicate areas of priority and responsibilities for action, and suggest an appropriate framework for legislation (BSDT, 2001 ). This proposed strategy has brought about a general soulsearching of objectives, processes and implementation methods for biosecurity. In particular, it has brought to the fore, the potential divisions of interest among different stakeholder groups. These stakeholders include environmentalists and conservationists concerned to promote the protection of native biodiversity (terrestrial and marine), a range of groups from the primary productionist sectors (pastoral agriculture, horticulture, forestry), tourism representatives, and those concerned with human health.
Although the past weight of operational prioritising has favoured economically significant organisms, growing awareness about the impacts of biological invaders on native species and ecosystems, and on human health, has prompted a wider consideration of biosecurity goals. The environmental viewpoint has grown in strength and promises to have an impact on the future objectives of the system. An 
Conclusion
In conclusion, New Zealand as a small island nation is threatened ecologically and economically by the increasingly fast and globalised nature of international trade and travel. The rapid movement of people by air from continent to continent, movement of cargo by roll-on-roll-off container, and expulsion of ballast by ships, are some of the ways by which biological organisms move from country to country. While many of the organisms fail to survive in the places they land, a significant number manage to survive and naturalise in their new environment. They may come to pose a threat to native biodiversity, or human health and economic well-being in the host country.
Biodiversity loss has come to be recognised as a world-wide problem, with long-term detrimental consequences. This recognition has influenced the views and concerns of environmentalists in New Zealand, and their involvement in a government review of biosecurity issues and objectives. New Zealand's commitment to the international Biodiversity Convention has also reinforced concern with the biodiversity aspects of biosecurity. From an earlier biosecurity focus on economically significant pests, weeds and diseases, there has developed a wider concern with threats from bioinvasives for native plants, animals and ecosystems.
Unfortunately, protection for primary production does not always coincide with ecological protection of native species and ecosystems, and the New Zealand record of effective control of potentially dangerous invasives is heavily weighted in favour of primary production. By contrast, prevention and control mechanisms have been much less successful for organisms that threaten native species and ecosystems. The record of success and failure is a consequence of political and institutional priorities that have in the past, strongly favoured economically important pests over environmental pests.
Over the past decade there has been a growing awareness by environmentalists of the importance of biosecurity for native biodiversity, and in New Zealand this awareness has been expressed through involvement in a policy review process. While the process is not yet complete, it seems likely that a final outcome will reflect greater awareness of biodiversity issues by biosecurity officials, and heightened efforts by the environmental community to incorporate biodiversity objectives into the biosecurity framework. 
